Jake Bishop

Jan 16, 2001

Swinburne

Chapter 5

Swinburne writes,

But consciousness, I shall be arguing, cannot be the property of a mere body, a material object. … I shall give the traditional name of soul.  [69]

Anything is a substance if it can cause an event, or if something can cause a change in it. So, as well as material substances, substances which occupy volumes of space, there may be immaterial ones as well, which do not occupy space.   [70]

Here, Swinburne interjects the existence of some type of substance or event-causing-force that does not exist in space, but he does not clarify the existence of this substance, or the evidence or observation of a event-causing-force that has a more probable explanation than simple substance-in-space.

Properties and events may be physical or mental.

Among physical events are brain events.

Evidently – more evidently than anything else – there really are mental events, as we know from our own experience. [71]

Swinburne first states as fact the proposition that events can be divided into physical or mental, without developing a basis for believing this as fact.  Based on this assumption as fact, he divides events into those which exist in the world that we can observe, and those of our “mental experience” that cannot be observed by outside persons.

It is plausible that events occur only as physical events.  As humans, we like to consider ourselves containing properties of thought and being separate from our brains, instinct, and bodily existence.  But it is reasonable to consider that all events are physical, that our emotions, thoughts, and experiences are purely reactions in our brain. Our existence could be limited by our bodies just as animals, perhaps perceived differently only because of the greater complexity of our mental (brain) capacity.

Humans look at simpler animals, such as birds, and recognize that they do not have the same mental capacity as humans, and thus would assume under Swinburne that they do not possess a soul.

But what if birds, in their simpler level of mind capacity, consider themselves the “highest level of conciousness”, and in their minds consider that they must possess some external existence, because they have a higher intelligence than earthworms?  Could not humans then also share this perspective, in assuming that because we cannot fully understand or comprehend the capabilities of our own brains?  Perhaps if aliens, who possess a higher level of intelligence and consciousness than humans, consider us simple, animal-like creatures, and that they possess souls while we humans do not.

Therefore it is also probable to argue that we do in fact possess existence only in physical bodies, and that all experiences, emotions, and events occur within that physical substance.

Swinburne automatically assumes that events can be separated between the objective and subjective, without recognizing it is equally probable that all events are objective, if given an intelligence and a vantage point to recognize it.